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CASE NOTES
act are defeated. As the Board has noted in a comparable context, "What-
ever may be lost in maximum industrial efficiency ... is more than compen-
sated for by the gain in industrial democracy .. . . "53 If section 9(c) (3)
is to be construed as prohibiting collective bargaining for one year after
an election lost by the union, this mandate should issue from Congress and
not through judicial legislation. 54
RUTH R. BUDD
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Unfair Labor Practices
—Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation.—Local 12, United Rubber
Workers v. NLR11. 1—Petitioner, Local 12, was the exclusive bargaining
representative of all the employees at an Alabama Goodyear plant. Although
the bargaining contract negotiated and administered by Local 12 appeared
to provide otherwise, separate seniority rolls were maintained for White
and Negro employees, and, as a result, Negro employees had no greater
rights than White employees with less seniority. In addition, although not
prescribed by the contract, racially separate plant facilities were maintained.
In the Fall of 1961, a Negro employee was laid off even though a White
employee with less seniority was being retained. As a result of this action,
he and seven other Negroes, who were also in layoff status, appeared before
the union grievance committee and demanded reinstatement with back pay,
transfer privileges as provided in the contract, and desegregation of plant
facilities. The committee rejected their claims, and the complainants appealed
to the International President of the union, who reversed the local's refusal
to process the grievances. Local 12 then obtained an agreement from
the company dissolving the separate seniority rolls, but it continued in its
refusal to process the grievances concerning back pay and segregated plant
facilities. Consequently, the complainants filed unfair-labor-practice charges
against Local 12.
Reversing the trial examiner, the National Labor Relations Board ruled 2
that, by refusing to process these grievances, Local 12 had not only violated
Sections 8(b) (2) and (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 3 but had also violated
section 8 (b) (1) (A) by restraining or coercing complainants in their section
7 right to be represented "without invidious discrimination." Local 12
53 American Potash & Chem. Corp., supra note 37, at 1423.
54 Certiori has recently been denied in the principal case. 35 U.S.L. Week 3330 (U.S
March 21, 1967).
1 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
2 Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964).
3 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(3)(2), (3) (1964). The violations of
these sections are not discussed by the court, and thus are not subjects of this note.
4 150 N.L.R.B. at 315. LMRA § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964)
provides that
employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities . . . .
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petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for a review of the Board's
decision. HELD• Enforcement granted. The court found: (1) that Local
12's refusal to process the grievances was a breach of its duty of fair
representations implicit in Section 9 of the Taft-Hartley Act;° (2) that
the right to such representation is an integral part of the employees' section
7 right "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing"; 7 and (3) that Local 12, in failing to represent complainants
fairly, had committed an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (1) (A). 8
The substantive holding of the Fifth Circuit is of paramount im-
portance in that it gives appellate approval to a novel approach, previously
set forth by the Board in a number of rulings, 9 to the problem of remedying
discriminatory practices by labor organizations against members of the
bargaining unit. In examining the rationale of this approach, it is important
to note that the conduct of a union is not within the remedial jurisdiction of
the Board unless such conduct can be characterized as an unfair labor
practice under one of the section 8(b) provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.19
It is evident from the broad language of section 8(b) (1) (A) that, in order
to determine whether there has been a violation of that section, the extent
of section 7's coverage must first be ascertained, including the scope of the
employees' right "to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing." Under the rationale of the instant case, it is reasoned that
the full extent of the right to bargain collectively cannot be ascertained
without reference to the duties owed to the employees by the representing
union. 11 Since section 9 of the act imposes upon the union, as exclusive
representative, the implicit duty of fair representation, it follows, under the
LMRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(1)(A) (1964) provides '
that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—(1) to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ...."
5 368 F.2d at 19.
6 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Syres v. Oil Workers Intl Union,
350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944). LMRA § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1964) provides that
representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any indi-
vidual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjust-
ment is not inconsistent with the terms of collective-bargaining contract or
agreement then in effect . . . .
7 368 F.2d at 17.
8 Id. at 17, 20.
9 Automobile Workers, 149 N.L.R.B. 482 (1964); Local 1367, Intl Longshore-
mens Union, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced per curiam, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1966); Independent Metal Workers, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
•10 LMRA § 8(b), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964).
11 See Comment, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts,
73 Yale L.J. 1215, 1235-37 (1964).
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logic of this case, that section 7 encompasses the employees' correlative right
to be represented fairly. Consequently, reading the section 9 duty of fairness
as an integral part of the employees' section 7 right, it is concluded that a
breach of the duty by the bargaining representative is an unfair labor
practice within the remedial jurisdiction of the Board under section 8(b)
(1)(A).
The appellate decision in the Local 12 case is of further importance in
that it is inconsistent with NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co 12 In that case, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement to a Board order"
which held that the reduction of an employee on the seniority list because of
"irrelevant, invidious, or unfair" 14 considerations constituted a violation
of section 8(b) (1) (A). Although the Miranda decision cannot be considered
an outright rejection of the rationale adopted in the instant case, 15 it does
create enough inconsistency to raise a strong possibility that the issue will
be presented for Supreme Court determination.
The Local 12 holding is also noteworthy because of the problem of
conflicting remedies that will inevitably occur. Historically, redress for a
breach of the duty of fair representation has been within the jurisdiction
of the state' and federal courts. 17 However, if the Local 12 decision re-
ceives substantial acceptance, the courts will be relieved of much of their
original jurisdiction over unfair representation cases. This conclusion is
based on the ruling of San 'Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmonis that
"when an activity is arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the Act,
the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive compe-
tence of the National Labor Relations Board . . . ."'° The extent of this
exclusive jurisdiction over unfair representation cases will be extremely
difficult to determine, however, due to the inconclusive scope of two apparent
exceptions to the Garmon preemption doctrine. First, it is recognized that
a suit based on the collective-bargaining agreement may be maintained
against an employer, and, possibly, against a labor organization as joint
defendant,2° under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 21 regardless of
12 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
13 Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 9. Although the decision of the Board was on a
vote of 3-2, the two dissenting members did not challenge the crucial premise of the
majority that the duty of fair representation was to be read as a correlative § 7 right.
14 Id. at 185.
15 Of the three judges, only Judge Medina seems to have clearly rejected the
Board's finding that the action of the union constituted a violation of § 8(6)(1) (A).
Judge Lumbard, concurring, specifically refrained from deciding the § 8(b)(1)(A)
issue, and Judge Friendly, dissenting, based his decision on a finding of a § 8(b) (2)
violation and did not consider the § 8(b) (1) (A) issue.
to E.g., Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946); Wilson v. Ex-Cell-0
Corp., 368 Mich. 61, 117 N.W.2d 184 (1962).
17 E.g., Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961);
Union News Co.:v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
12 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
15 Id. at 245.
20 Humphrey v. Moore, supra note 6.
21 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964) provides that "suits for viola-
tion of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties ... ."
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whether the basis of the action may also "arguably" be an unfair labor
practice.22 However, a recent Supreme Court ruling appears to have extended
this "contract" exception to certain actions brought against the union alone,
thus adding to the difficulty in determining the extent of the preemption
doctrine.23
As a second exception, the scope of the Garman doctrine may be limited
by the subsequently enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 24
This act forbids as an "unlawful labor practice" discrimination by a labor
organization on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin, 25 and
gives jurisdiction to an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Thus,
where a particular discriminatory act by a labor organization may be reason-
ably characterized as either an "unlawful labor practice" under Title VII or
a breach of the duty of fair representation and, therefore, an unfair labor
practice under the rationale of the instant case, a definite conflict of remedial
jurisdiction will occur. However, since Congress obviously intended to
place such acts either exclusively within the remedial procedure of the
EEOC, or concurrently under the jurisdiction of the NLRB, 26 it is inevitable
that the Board's exclusive jurisdiction over such unfair representation cases
will be significantly qualified once the provisions of Title VII are enforced.
In view of the novelty of the Board's approach, the conflict of Local 12
with Miranda, and the jurisdictional difficulties that will be presented, it
is of utmost importance to carefully evaluate the holding of the instant
case. In making such a determination, one must look to the legislative
history and congressional intent concerning the scope of the Board's juris-
diction, as well as to the statutory language of the governing acts. Further-
more, these factors must be viewed in the context of a changing national
22 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
23 Vaca v. Sipes, 35 U.S.L. Week 4213 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1967). Mr, Justice White,
speaking for the majority, in a strained and unclear opinion, upheld the jurisdiction
of the state of Missouri over a suit by an employee against a labor organization for
its failure to process a grievance to arbitration. Labeling the action as one founded
on contract, be based his opinion on an extension of the scope of § 301 to suits by
employees directly against the labor organization. Mr. Justice Fortas, joined by the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan, concurred in the result, adopting the view that the
basis of the claim was a breach of the union's duty of fair representation rather than
a breach of the bargaining contract. He concluded that the action was, thus, an unfair
labor practice claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB and not subject to
the jurisdiction of the state of Missouri.
24 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to h-6 (1964).
25 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
20 Although the contention that Title VII jurisdiction is exclusive has received
some support, see Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 771, 805-20 (1965), a conclusion of concurrent jurisdic-
tion has the support of both statutory language and legislative history. 78 Stat. 268,
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-3 (1964) provides that nothing contained in the act shall be con-
strued to 'affect any right or authority . . . of the United States or any agency . . .
thereof under existing law to institute or intervene in any action or proceeding." In
addition, the Senate rejected an amendment that would have rendered the provisions
of Title VII exclusive with respect to all claims arising under it. See 110 Cong. Rec.
11719 (1964).
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labor policy based on developments in social and economic conditions and
beliefs.
In opposition to the substantive holding of the instant case, it has
been argued that legislative history supports neither an incorporation of
the section 9 duty of fair representation into section 7, nor an identification
of a breach of the duty as an unfair labor practice. Specifically, it has
been pointed out that in 1935, when sections 7 and 9 were first enacted,
Congress was concerned exclusively with protecting employees from hostile
employers, 27 and that it was not until 1947, with the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act, that the conduct of unions was brought within the jurisdiction
of the NLRB. 2s At that time, it had been three years since Steele v. Louis-
ville & AT.R.R., 29 which recognized that a union certified under the Railway
Labor Act has a statutory duty "to exercise fairly the power conferred upon
It in behalf of all those for whom it acts without hostile discrimination against
them,'w and Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 3 ' which held the duty of fair repre-
sentation to be implicit in section 9 of the NLRA. Thus, even after judicial
recognition of the duty of fair representation, Congress, in 1947, did not
change section 7, nor did it take any other affirmative action to make the
breach of the duty an unfair labor practice. 32
Again, in 1953, Congress had an opportunity to take such affirmative
action, but instead, it dismissed a proposal to make racial discrimination an
unfair labor practice. 33 Subsequently, in 1959, with the enactment of the
Landrum-Griffin Act,34 Congress remained silent on the issue of unfair
representation as an unfair labor practice. Finally, when Congress was
considering the Civil Rights Act of 1954, it rejected another opportunity
to specifically address itself to this issue.35
On the basis of this history of congressional inaction, it has been argued
that Congress has manifested an intent to exclude the breach of the duty
of fair representation from the cognizance of the unfair labor practice
provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act." if this is an accurate reading of the
congressional history, it would seem clear that the holding of the instant
case is incorrect.
An examination of the circumstances surrounding the relevant con-
gressional proposals reveals, however, that many of the adverse legislative-
27 Sec Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435 (1963).
28 In § 8(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress made certain activities of the
union unfair labor practices within the remedial jurisdiction of the NLRB. 61 Stat.
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964).
29 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
30 Id. at 203.
31 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
32 Comment, Racial Discrimination and the Duty of Fair Representation, 65
Colum. L. Rev. 273, 274 (1965).
33 Sherman, supra note 26, at 808.
34 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 401-531 (1964).
35 Sherman, supra note 26, at 808.
36 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 12, at 178.
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history arguments are without substance. The 1953 proposal to make
racial discrimination an unfair labor practice was never reported out of
committee, 37
 and thus cannot properly be considered a reflection of con-
gressional intent. In 1959, furthermore, when Congress was considering the
Landrum-Griffin Act, its primary concern was with the internal affairs of
unions and was based on a premise of separating the internal affairs from the
collective-bargaining process. 38
 Therefore, since unfair representation claims
basically arise out of the negotiation and administration stages of the col-
lective-bargaining process, congressional silence at that time cannot be
considered a valid indication of the sense of Congress on this issue. Finally,
in 1964, the proposal by Senator Prouty to make racial discrimination an
unfair labor practice was intended as a complete substitute for Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,89
 and thus cannot realistically be construed as
rejected on its merits.
It is apparent, then, that the legislative history is inconclusive and that
arguments based upon it are, at best, unpersuasive. In this respect, it
is submitted that congressional silence is not determinative in interpreting
the various sections of the Taft-Hartley Act. Specifically, although Congress
has not affirmatively indicated an intent to make a violation of the duty
of fair representation an unfair labor practice, neither did it clearly mani-
fest an intent to create such a duty under section 9 of the act. Nevertheless,
such a duty has been found." Furthermore, the fact that the relationship of
labor and management is a contemporary and changing problem of such
magnitude as to be susceptible of legal development on all fronts—judicial,
administrative, and legislative41—lends further support to the holding of
Local 12. Although the primary purpose of the enactment of the National
Labor Relations Act may have been to facilitate the collective-bargaining
process between employers and labor organizations, subsequent labor policy
has reflected a growing recognition that union strength may be exercised to
the detriment of members of the represented bargaining unit. Such recog-
nition is indicated by the fact that all significant labor legislation in the
last twenty years has been extensively directed at the protection of the
individual employee. This legislation has included: (1) the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947, which provides for the identification of various acts of labor
organizations as unfair labor practices," allows individual presentation of
grievances under certain circumstances," and provides for the institution
in the courts of suits based on the collective-bargaining contract,'" (2)
the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, which protects employees in regard to
the internal affairs of the union; 45 and (3) Title VII of the Civil Rights
37 99 Cong. Rec. 4437 (1953).
88 Blumrosen, supra note 27, at 1474.
38 110 Cong. Rec. 10360-61 (1964).
40 See authorities cited note 6 supra.
41 Blumrosen, supra note 27, at 1438.
42 61 	 Stat. 	 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. $ 	 158(b) 	 (1964).
43 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
	 (1964).
44 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) 	 (1964).
48 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401-531 	 (1964).
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Act of 1964, which protects individuals against union discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, sex, and national origin." These enactments make it
abundantly clear that the protection of the employee from detrimental
union action has been a dominant characteristic of congressional labor
policy.
Given this pattern in the development of the national labor policy,
the rationale of Local 12 is certainly substantiated by the language of the
act itself. A broad scope of authority for the Board is indicated by the
purpose clause of section 1, which states in part that "it is the purpose
and policy of this act . . . to protect the rights of individual employees in
their relations with labor organizations . . . . "4.5 The breadth of this power
received judicial recognition in the Garmon case, where the Supreme Court
stated that "the unifying consideration of our decisions has been regard
to the fact that Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy
of our Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own
procedures, and equipped with specialized knowledge and cumulative ex-
perience . . . »48 Keeping in mind this broad scope of authority, the in-
terpretation of Local 12 is perfectly consonant with the language of sections
7 and 9. By section 7, employees are guaranteed the right to "bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing." Since these repre-
sentatives, selected by a majority of the employees, are the exclusive repre-
sentatives of all the members of the bargaining unit," the right guaranteed
by section 7 would be virtually meaningless if certified representatives
could act or refuse to act in behalf of particular employees on unfair or
arbitrary grounds. Since it must be assumed that Congress would not intend
to create a potentially 'meaningless right, it is difficult to avoid a finding
that such right must be protected by an obligation of fair representation.
Thus, it is within the logic and spirit of the act to conclude that the em-
ployees' section 7 right includes the right to fair representation, and that
such right is guaranteed by designating the breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation as an unfair labor practice under section 8 (b) (1) (A).
The Local 12 rationale is, moreover, not only legally supportable but
also highly desirable in view of the many advantages that the jurisdiction
of the Board will open to the employee asserting an unfair representation
claim. Most importantly, this decision will provide complainants alleging
a breach of the duty of fair representation unprecedented accessibility to a
"free" tribunal, since, under Board procedure, an individual complainant
is not required to pay any litigation expenses, with the exception of expenses
for appeal if his charges are dismissed. 5° The NLRB, moreover, dealing
exclusively with problems of labor law, possesses the advantage of special
competence and expertise in dealing with problems concerning the col-
4° 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. 	 2000e-2c (1964).
47 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 	 141(b) (1964).
46 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).
49 LMRA 9(a), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 	 159(a) (1964).
5° Comment, Refusal to Process a Grievance, the NLRB, and the Duty of Fair
Representation: A Plea for Preemption, 26 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 593, 618 (1965).
•
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lective-bargaining process. 51 In addition, the NLRB has a broad power of
investigation and the authority and ability to urge, through the regional
director, informal settlements of grievances and to provide expeditious
hearings." Furthermore, besides these administrative advantages, the Board,
as a single agency, would be more effective than geographically scattered
and ideologically diverse courts in establishing workable, consistent standards
of fair representation." Thus, it is evident that legislative history, national
labor policy, statutory language, and jurisdictional desirability all support
the holding of Local 12 that the duty of fair representation implicit in section
9 is reflected by a correlative right in section 7, thereby making a breach of
that duty an unfair labor practice under section 8 (b) ( 1 ) (A).
JOHN J. REID
Labor Law—Railway Labor Act—Norris-LaGuardia Act—Injunction
Against Secondary Labor Boycott.—Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 1—The Florida East Coast Railway (FEC),
the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad (ACL), the Seaboard Air Line Railroad
(SAL), and the Southern Railway each owned twenty-five per cent of the
stock of the Jacksonville Terminal Company, a Florida corporation. Under
contracts called "Operating and Guaranty Agreements," the Terminal Com-
pany provided certain services and facilities to the four stockholding railroads
as well as to the Georgia Southern and Florida Railway.."-- In anticipation of
a strike against it by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, FEC obtained
an injunction against the Terminal Company and the other three stockholding
railroads, requiring them to perform the terms of the "Operating and
Guaranty Agreements." 3
The Brotherhood struck FEC after the exhaustion of the statutory
procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, at which point neither
party had any recourse under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). 4
 The union
51 See Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsi-
bility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1358-59 (1958).
52 Blumrosen, supra note 27, at 1514.
53 Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151, 173 (1957).
I 362 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
2 These services and facilities included, for example, freight interchange, track main-
tenance, switching and repair services, and "car service" as defined by the Interstate
Commerce Act, 40 Stat. 101 (1917), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 100) (1964). 362 F.2d
at 650.
3 No opinion was published in that case.
Although the lower court's order specifically purported to bind the employees
of both the defendant Terminal Company and the Railroad defendants, the
court denied an application by the union representatives of said employees to
intervene in an attempt to dissolve this injunction . . . It was not appealed,
since the brotherhoods were not permitted to intervene, and thus there was
no aggrieved party.
Id. at 651.
4 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. ¢§ 151-63 (1964). For the history of
this dispute between FEC and its employees, see Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States,
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